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SITUATION

I

INSURRECTION, BELLIGERENCY,
STATEHOOD
There has been an insurrection in a part of state Y.
'l'he insurrectionists, known as the Y otists, have received unofficial aid and some sympathy from state X,
and after a few 'veeks have been recognized by state
X as state Y ota. States A and B also recognize Y ota,
but state Y has not recognized Y ota.
(a) Y ota subsequently declares war against state C.
{1) How should naval and aircraft of Y ota and of
C be treated in state B and in state D 1
{2) What effect would the recognition of Yota as a
state by Y have upon the treatment of naval and aircraft of Y ota and of C 1
•
(b) Before Y ota is recognized by state Y, a cruiser
of Yota captures a merchant vessel of D and is taking
it to a prize court when a cruiser of state D, which is
near, learns the facts. What action rnay the cruiser
of stateD legally take~
(c) Before Yota is recognized by state Y, state E
declares its ports open under the 24-hour rule, while
Yota declares all its ports closed to vessels of 'var.
\'Vhat are the rights of vessels of war of E in the ports~
SOLUTION

(a) 1. The naval air aircraft of Yota and of C are
to be treated by states B and D as naval and aircraft
of belligerents, though Y ota would not be regarded as
a state by state D.
1
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2. The recognition of Yota as a state by Y entitles
the naYal and air craft of Yota to the sa1ne treatlnent
as the naYnl and air craft of state C in all neutral ports.
(b) The cruiser of state D n1ay, outside the jurisdiction of a foreign state, dentand the release, and, if refused, use necessary force to secure the release of the
merchant Yessel of D.
(c) State E, not haYing recognized the ) ... otists as a
state, are not bound to respect the declaration of closure,
though state. E n1ust take into consideration the risk
involYed in d1sregarding the declaration.
XOTES

Gr>neral.-That there is a right of revolution has in

practice been accepted for 1nany years. rfhe older
European states "·ere particularly opposed to this doctrine in the early nineteenth century, "·hen they had
:-\.n1erican colonies, and established states usually looked
upon revolutions "·ith disfavor. Gradually it came to
be achnitted that there ''"as a lin1it beyond w·hich an
established state should not be responsible for action of
persons in arn1ed organized revolt against its political
n.uthority, and these insurrectionists "~ere not to be regarded as pirates, eYen though par~nt states did son1eti1nes declare then1 to be pirates. nfany 1110dern states
"·ere obliged to look to successful reYolutions as the
ground upon "·hich their existence rested. There are
various reasons for accepting such an assertion. If the
successful reYolutionists "·ere not achnitted to haYe son1e
status, many obligations "·hich the reYolutionists might
have asstuned "·ould be en1pty. The established state
could not 1Je liable beyond the exercise of the force at
its disposal.
Just "·hen a foreign state ,yould decide that those
admitted to be jnsurgents "·ere beyond the control of
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the established state and should receive recognition as
belligerents \Vas a political question for the foreign
state, unless the parent state should earlier recognize
belligerency by a resort to war or other,vise. Foreign
states are not under obligation to suffer undue inconvenience in order that a \veak established state may
have an unlimited time to put down an uprising \vithin
its borders. Many questions arise as to the nature of
rights and obligations of established states and insurgents.
State or government and £nternat£onal law.-The
state or the government of a state may have many functions and attributes relating to internal and relating to
external affairs. The internal affairs may rest upon
constitutional la,v, \vhile the external may be determined by international law.
A political entity, \vhich by constitutional la \V of a
st~te might have no existence, might become for international la\v a matter of capital importance. The dornestic and internatjonal legitimacy of the existence of
a political entity may rest upon conditions of altogether different nature. The legitimacy of the existence
of a political entity for international la\v n1ay depend
upon the action of one or more foreign states, and this
action may be in contravention of the \viii of an established state from \vhich the political entity may be
f,eparating. This is evident in many states of revolutionary origin.
Recognition of belligerency.-The admission of insurgency by the competent authorities of a foreign state
may bring into operation certain domestic laws and certain treaty obligations of that foreign state though no
international status is accorded to the insurgents. The
recognition of belligerency does, however, give an immediate parity in international military status to both
parties to the conflict. This is a general parity of mili-
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tary rights as regards all states when recognition is by
the parent state, or as regards the recognizing state or
states when the parent state has not recognized the insurgents as belligerents.
Recognition of belligerency is thus a formal act estab ..
lishing a status 'vhich changes the relations of all parties
involved. When this change shall be made is usually a
n1atter of policy and therefore a matter primarily concerning the political departments of the governments.
It is true that in the case of the Three Friends the
Court uses the ''ord "recognition" both for political revolt and for war. The court, however, does distinguish
between political revolt and war and implies that the
first may be a fact and the second a status, saying:
"The distinction between recognition of belligerency and recognition of a condition of political revolt, between recognition of
the existence of war in a rna terial sense and of war in a legal
sense, is sharply illustrated by the case before us. For here the
political department has not recognized the existence of a de
facto belligerent power engaged in hostility with Spain, but has
recognized the existence of insurrectionary warfare prevailing
before, at the time and since this forfeiture is alleged to ba-re
been incurred." (166 U. S. 1.)

The President had in 1895 and in earlier messages
stated the fact that "Cuba is again gravely disturbed"
and that the people of the United States should take 1his
fact into consideration in their actions. The Court maintains that domestic laws in regard to neutrality may become operative 'vithout any status of belligerency, while
the recognition of belligerency would bring into effect
blockade, visit and search, contraband, and other interference by the belligerent parties without claim for
reparation or damages. By the recognition of belligerency, the status of all parties as far as the recognizing
states are involved is changed and their relations are to a
considerable degree a matter of concern for international
]a,Y.
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Admlssion of insurgency.-The "\Yords "admission" and
"recognition" have often been used "~ithout distinction
as applying to insurgency. On examination there seems
to be a distinction 'vhich has been 1nade in actual practice.
.
The fact of an insurrection is usually evident, and as
such must be admitted by the parent state and by foreign states. To this fact forejgn states may have to
accommodate themselves 'vithout i1nplying anything as
to the final issue or present nature of the fact. As 'vas
pointed out in the case of the "Salvador" in 1870 by the
,Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a main point
jn a case involving insurrection is the factual one of the
existence of an insurrection. The Judicial Committee
found "there 'vas an insurrection in the island of Cuba;
there were insurgents who had forined themselves into a
body of people acting together, undertaking and conducting hostilities" (L. R. P. A. C. 1869-71, III, p. 218).
It is not even essential that there be any for1nal governmental proclan1ation by any state o£ the existence of
an insurrection. The domestic peace o£ a state is often
disturbed without involving other states beyond presuming that they will govern their conduct accordingly.
..A. foreign government may bring to the attention of its
citizens or o£ some of its departinents the £act of an
insurrection. Such a notice may even be regarded by the
courts as official for domestic purposes. This was mentioned by the Supreme Court in the case of the Three;,
Friends, in 1897, after President Cleveland had referred
in his message of December 2, 1895, to an insurrection as
existing in Cuba:
"We are thus judicially informed of the existence of an actual
conflict of arms in resistance of the authority of a government
with which the United States are on terms of peace and amity,
although acknowledgment of the insurgents as belligerents by the
political department has not taken place." (166 U. S. 1.)
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In this case it \Yas stated that a certain section of don1estic la ''" \Yould be in effect and its operation would not
"depend upon the recognition of belligerency."
After such an ad1nission by a foreign state, that state
1night be under obligation to accom1nodate its conduct to
the facts, bnt it would not thereby grant to the parent
state and to the insurgents parity of military rights. A
foreign state 1nay, 'vithout implying any judgn1ent upon
the issues or extent of the conflict, adn1it that there is a
conflict and instruct those under its jurisdiction accordingly. rrhe fact of an insurrection may bring into operation do1nestic la\YS and these domestic laws of one state
do not necessarily confonn to the la ,~,...s of other states.
By treaty, hO\\eYer, a 1neasure of uniformity may be
envisaged. Since 1928 a Convention relating to the
Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife,
(HabPna, Feu. 20, 1928, 46 Stat. Pt. 2, 2749), to which
the United States is a party, has distinctly obligated the
parties to the treaty to follo'' a line of conduct iinplying the acln1ission of a different status fron1 that binding in ti1ne of peace or \Yhen belligerency is recognized.
This Conyention is, at present, regional in its operation.
Insurgency.-'fhat there is a status of insurgency
"·hich does not involYe the consequences of belligerency
is 110\Y \Yell established. rfhe ad1nission that SUCh a status·
exists has been somewhat reluctantly made by European
states. 1'here \vas a fear in the early nineteenth century
that such admission might be an encourage1nent to revolution. On the American continents most of the states
\Yere reYolutionary in origin and son1e ad1nission of the
facts of the struggle and accommodation of action to the
facts often beca1ne necessary
prior to the recoonition
of
•
b
belligPrency. A foreign state n1ight be deterred by political or other reasons fro1n granting to insurgents the
~ atne \Yar rights as those to 'vhich the parent state \vas
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entitled yet the fact o:f armed conflict could not be denied.
The parties engaged in the hostilities could not claim
rights o:f belligerents until the parent state had recognized that a state of war existed, except as regards an
individual state 'vhich had declared its neutrality. The
parent state might regard a declaration o:f neutrality in
ad-ranee o:f an act on its part equivalent to a declaration
o:f war as an un:f1\iendly act by the state n1aking the neutrality declaration, since so :far as the conduct o:f hostilities is concerned the declaration places the parent state
and the insurgents upon the same :footing as belligerents.
United States v. Palmer, 1818.-In a case involving
questions in regard to piracy in connection 'vith the civil
'var in Spanish-An1erican areas, it . was said by the
Supreme Court in 1818 :
"This court is further of opinion, that when a civil war rages in
a foreign nation, one part of which separates itself from the old
established government, and erects itself into a distinct govern·
ment, the courts of the union must view such newly constituted
government as it is viewed by the legislative and executive depart·
n1ents of the government of the United States. If the goYernment
of the union remains neutral, but recognizes the existence of a
civil war, the courts of the union cannot consider as criminal those
acts of hostility, which war authorizes, and which the new government may direct against its enemy. In general, the same tes··
timony which would be sufficient to prove that a vessel or a person
is in the service of an acknowledged state, n1ust be admitted to
prove that a vessel or person is in the service of such newly erected
government." (United States v. Palmer, 3 vVheaton, Supreme
Court Reports, 610, 643.)

Consul of Spain v. The Conception, 1819.-While the
decision in this case was reversed in the case of The Conception ( 6 Wheaton [1821 J, 235), it 'vas reYersed on ne'v
evidence without which the decision 'vould have been
sustained. In the Circuit Court of South Carolina in
1819 it was said:
The indisputable fact known, to all the world, and recognized hy
our ,own executive in many official communications, of the existence of open, solemn war between Spain and an extensive and
powerful colony, is enough to impose on us, as a nation, the duties
of neutrality. The colony asserts, the social compact is violated
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by the parent state, and the state of dependence or allegiance no
longer existing. On this question an appeal is made to the god of
armies, and no inferior tribunal ought to interrere. The colony
claims from us no acknowledgment of her independence; she only
demands of us to leave her in possession of what she can win by
arms. Spain, unable to rescue by force, solicits our aid to seize,
in violation of the rights of hospitality, the property that has
been forced into our harb.ors; our duty is to lend our aid to
neither, but to leave them as we find them, rigidly adhering to the
duties of neutrality. This is not a piratical capture, and therefore not a case within the provisions of our treaty with Spain. It
is a seizure in the exercise of the rights of war, not by one who
wages war against the human race, but one who has singled out
Spain for the sole antagonist. .All seizures of property within our
limits we are bound by that treaty to prevent, but the duty to
restore is confined solely to the case of rescue from those whom
we can recognize as pirates. In the case of Palmer and others, in
the supreme court, the principles laid down by the chief justice
excluded all idea that this was a piratical capture. It was then
a seizure jure belli, and the rights of war are necessarily cmnmensurate with the power of maintaining it openly and solen1nly,
more especially upon the high seas, the jurisdiction of which is
not susceptible of that demarkation and appropriation which takes
place on the land. This conflict has long been carried on between
the colony and parent state. The event is at least doubtful. It is
on both sides an assertion of a supposed existing right, and neither
can claim, of a nation to whom their disputes are immaterial, any
act of interference which may involve it in a contest with the
victor. (Consul of Spain v. The Conception. [1819.] Fed. Case,
No. 3137.)

Effect of declaration of blockade against insurgents.As was held in the Civil War in the United States so it
has been held since: the declaration of a blockade against
insurgents by an established state gives to the insurgents
the status of belligerents. This question has been raised
repeatedly, as by Spain, to which Great Britain gave
reply in 1874 :
"Earl Granville to l\lr. Layard.
"FoREIGN OFFICE, Febr-uary 13, 187.q.
"SIR: By your telegrams of the 2d instant you informed me of
the publication, in the Madrid Gazette, of a decree declaring a
blockade of the northern coast of Spain from Cape Penas to
Fuentarrabia, with the exception of the ports of Gijon, Santander, and San Sebastian, such blockade to commence on the 20th
instant.
"Her ~Iajesty's government have taken this announcement into
their serious consideration, and have consulted the law-officers
of the Crown thereon.
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"They are advised that, assuming the blockade to be effective,
they must recognize the fact that it exists de facto and de jure.
The result, however, will be that the Carlists henceforth become
belligerents.
"Her Majesty's government presume that the parts of the coast
to which the blockade is applied are in the bands of the Carlists,
for the l\1adrid government cannot establish a municipal blockade
of its own ports or coast, so as to entitle them to exercise $n the
high seas belligerent rights against foreign vessels.
"I have, therefore, to instruct you to warn the Spanish government that the establishment of the proposed blockade must
lead to the issue by Her 1\.fajesty's government of a proclamation
of neutrality.
"Your dispatches, No. 106, of the 2d, and No. 125, of the 6th
instant, relative to the regulations under which the blockade, if
established, is to be carried out, have been received. These regulations will be carefully considered by Her 1\:lajesty's government, and a further instruction will be sent to you with regard
to them.
"The substance of this instruction bas been sent to you by
telegraph this day.
"I am, &c.,
GRAN VILLE."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1874, p. 551.)

Simultaneous recognition of de facto government.Insurrections or revolutions may for a time be successful and an established government may be overthro"Tn.
Whether the overthro'\\"r be permanent may be a matter
of uncertainty, though in such cases the fact that the
control of governmental affairs has passed from the
former hands must be admitted in order that necessary
relations may be maintained. This admission sometinles takes the form of the recognition of the party in
control as the government de facto without any necessary implication that further action will follow. When,
however, several states simultaneously grant recognition
de facto, it may be fairly presumed that this is preliminary to complete recognition.
A military coup d'etat was reported in Bolivia on
July 12, 1920, and the junta taking over the government
gave assurances that peace wo~d be maintained, that the
rights of foreigners would be respected and that treaty
obligations would be observed.
1820-37--2
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.A. dispat~h of July 17, 1920, :from the Secretary of
State to the A1nerican l\1inister in Bolivia stated:
''The Department desires you to keep it fully and closely informed of all developments in the situation, particularly those
affecting the foreign policy of the Government now in control.
You are instructed to take no action which could be construed
as constituting recognition of the Pro,·isional Government by the
Goyenuuent of the United States." (Foreign Relations, U. S.,
1020., ,·ol. I, p. 373.)

On July 20, 1920, a telegram :from the American l\1inister reported that:
"Peru yesterday recognized new Go,·ernment. Representatives
here of all other countries unanimous in opinion that there should
lJe no recognition now but unless something now unforeseen
~hould occur in next few days provisional recognition of de facto
Government with. ample guarantees [to] foreigners and foreign
interests pending holding of fair elections might be made. I
feel that we should recognize the new Government as soon as
possible but make it sufficiently provisional to provide for any
changes which would be mainly in the personnel if at all."
(Ibid., p. 374.)

The Secretary of State had said on the same date :
"The Departrnent desires to impress upon you the necessity of
exercising utmost discretion in communicating with revolutionary
Government. Your dealing with Junta should be limited to
entirely unofficial and infonnal intercourse, and you should confine your representations to questions affecting the interests of
the United States and the security of American life and property,
bearing in mind the fact that the Government of the United
~tates has not as yet recognized the revolutionary Government
as being eYen a de facto governtnent." (Ibid., p. 374.)

Paraguay recognized the ne'v government July 30,
1920, and the British Government planned to recognize
the de facto government a week later unless the situation
changed. Other states deemed it expedient to wait till
after elections ''ere held before taking action.
There 'vas correspondence of representatives of the
"l~nitecl States and other states in regard to recognizing
the de facto government simultaneously. Recognition
of a goyernment by concurrent action n1ay avoid confusion in some cases and 'viii usually strengthen the position of the goYernment recognized. By preYious under-
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standii)g the ne'v govern1nent o:f Bolivia 'vas recognized
by the United States, Argentina, Chile and Brazil at
3 P. M., February 9, 1921.
Simultaneous recognition o:f Paraguay took place on
:\larch 14, 1936.
The An1erican Charge d'Affaires at La Paz on ~fay 30,
1936, extended recognition to the Government o:f Bolivia,
and Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and other
A1nerican republics took similar action at the same time.
Joint delay in recognition.-In 1921, 'vhen affairs in
~Iexico 'vere disturbed, there 'vas much correspondence
an1ong :foreign offices in regard to delaying recognition.
The exchange o:f telegra1ns bet,v_een the governments o:f
the United States and o:f Belgiun1 sho,vs such delay :
"BRussELS, Novernber 4, 1921, 4 p. 1n.

[Received November 5, 1: 45 p. 111.]
"48. Department's number 46, October 31, 1921. I have cOiumunicated with Jaspar, who has agreed not to extend recognition
to the Obr~on Government until such time as Great Britain.
France, ana the United States take such action. He states. however, that on account of the importanc.e of Belgian interests in
Mexico, the Government of Belgium would not want to be placed
in a position of being the last to extend recognition, and therefore
asks that when the time comes for any action looking toward
recognition, such action be taken simultaneously. Do you think
that an arrangement along these lines, which would solve Jaspar's
perplexities, 'vould be agreeable to the Department?
'VHITI:OCK"

Noventber 9, 1921, 2 p. ·m.
"47. Embassy's telegram number 48, November 4, 1921, 4 p. n1.
Inform the l\1inistcr of Foreign Affairs that we are highly pleased
to learn that the Government of Belgium has agreed not to extend
recognition to the Obregon Government until such time as Great
Britain, Fr[lnce, and the United States take such action. You
may give him assurance that when the time comes for any action
looking toward recognition, this Government will be pleased to
inform the Government of Belgium, to the end that such action
be taken simultaneously." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1921, vol. II,
p. 438.)
"WASHINGTON,

0 ollective recall of recognition.-During the unsettled
state o:f affairs in Costa Rica in 1919 there 'vere propositions in regard to collective or joint action by the Central
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An1erican States. On July 7, 1919, the American :Niinister to Nicaragua reported to the Department of State
fron1 )fanagua by telegram:
"Nicaraguan :\linister for Foreign Affairs informed me that he
received a telegram from Salvadorean :\Iini~ter for Foreign
Affairs calling attention to the recent events that have taken
place in Costa Rica and the gravity of the situation and the possibility of American intervention resulting therefrom, and the
necessity of joint action of the Central American States to adopt
some plan of action to bring about a solution of impending difficulties. Salvadorean Government requests the Nicaraguan Go\ernment to offer such suggestions as it 1nay judge most convenient
a nd expedient. Nicaraguan Government replied to the effect that
it approves important step taken by Salvadorean Government and
suggests that it take up the question with all Central American
States; that the Nicaraguan Government adheres to the principles
of the 'Vashington convention of 1907 and therefore suggests that
t he respecti\e Central American States proceed to recall their
recognition of the Tinoco government ; this should be done within
t he next 30 days. This done it would place the several GovernInents on an equal footing and then they could proceed to unite it
formulating a plan of concerted action.
JEFFERSON."

(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1919, vol. I, p. 844.)

A Senate resolution asked 'vhy "Costa Ricd, a belligerent with the Allies in the War just ended, was not
permitted to sign the treaty of peace at Versailles." In
a reply of August 16, 1919, the Secretary of State said:
''In view of the fact that the Government of the United States
has not recognized the existence in the Republic of Costa Rica
of a de jure or even a legitimately de facto Government, but holds
t hat only the people of Costa Rica can as a moral force set up
in that country a government constitutional in character and duly
sanctioned by law, it follows naturally that the Government of the
United States could not recognize as legally existent any manifestation of such a Government.
"To declare war is one of the highest acts of sovereignty. The
Government of Costa Rica being for the Government of the United
States legally nonexistent, it follows so far as the Government
of the United States is concerned, no state of war could exist
between Costa Rica and the Imperial German Government. Obviously there could be no question so far as this Government was
concerned as to signing with Costa Rica the Treaty of Peace of
Ve r~ailles.

'·Respectfully submitted,
( Ibid. , p. 853.)

ROBERT LANSIXG."

RESTRICTION ON DECLARATION OF WAR
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Restriction on declaration of toar.-That a third state
should interfere to prevent two other states :fron1 declaring war would be unusual. In 1921 the relations o:£
Panama and Costa Rica were severely strained in dispute over a boundary line. This line had already been
t'-rice submitted to arbitration, once to the French Government (Lou bet A ward, Sept. 11, 1900, Foreign Relations, U. S., 1910, p. 786), and once to the Chie:£ Justice
o:£ the United States (vVhite Award, Sept. 12~ 1914, Foreign Relations, U.S., 1914, p. 1000). Both these awards
gave rise to controversies, and Panama and Costa Rica
resorted to hostile action. This led the Secretary o:£
State !o telegraph at midnight, March 2, 1921, to the
}_._merican Minister at Panama as :follows:
"The Government of the United Stutes has seen with the deepest regret the hostilities which have tali:en place between the
armed forces of Panama and Costa Rica, from which loss of life
has resulted, and which have caused public sentiment in both
countries to be inflamed to a dangerous degree. It will be evident to the Government of Panama that this Government, by
reason of its special interests in the Isthmus, could not but view
with the gravest apprehension any developments which will disLurb the peace and tranquillity of Central America. While the
Government of the United States appreciates the assurances con,·eyed through you by the Government of Panama, the Government of the United States feels that a declaration of war because
of a controversy growing out of the inability of the Republics of
Costa Rica and Panama to agree upon a solution of the boundary
dispute, would be inadmissible. The dispute is one, as pointed
out in the Department's February 28, 2 p.m., which has already
been exan1ined during a period of years in the 1nost disinterested
and judicial Inanner, and it cannot but be evident that the only
lusting solution which can be found will be reached as the result
of the friendly offices of an impartial party to the controversy
and not by hostilities of the character which have already taken
place, which tend only further to excite the passions of the unruly
~lement in the populations of both Republics."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1921, vo. 1, p. 177.)

A similar dispatch was sent to the American Charge
jn Costa Rica.
Both Central American governntents 'vere advised to
withdraw their troops to the stat1.ts quo, Cerro PandoPunta Burica line, pending a final settlen1ent. The
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Gnited States acting as 1nediator inforn1ed Pana1na that
the . .~nerican govern1nent regarded the I . oubet a'vard
of territory on the Pacific to Costa Rica as just. and that
11nder the treaty relations bet,Yeen the Unii.ecl States antl
Pana1na could not "pern1it a rene,val of hostilities by
Panan1a against Costa Rica by reason of Costa Rica's
no'' taking peaceful possession of that territory" (Ibid,
p. 226). Panan1a announced its intention to avoid giv~ng cause for friction in this 1natter.
Recognition in general.-The term recognition is used
in different senses.
Few, if any: problen1s arise '\vhen the tenn is used to
designate the act by '\Yhich one state takes notice of a
change in another state, w·hen the change is in ·accord
''ith established or constitutional procedure. The succession of hereditary rulers 1nay involYe recognition of a
new person in the position of authority, but no change
in any other respect. In a government such as that of
the United States, presidents succeed one another in a
c-onstitutional 1nanner and a form of recognition is given
by foreign states to this fact without ~nvolving any
change in the identity or responsibility of the state itself.
It ·was said in the case of the Sapphire in 1871:
"The reigning sovereign represents the national soYereigntr. and
that soYereignty is continuous and perpetual resting in the proper
:-;nccessors of the soYereign for the time beiug." (11 "1'allace.
Snpr('me Court Reports, 164.)

The recognition by a state of a ne'\v political entity
''"hich has been formed in accord '\Yith the ''ill of the
party or parties '\vithin "~hose juri~diction the area and
population formerly '\Yere is a n1atter of policy and can
giYe no offense. This ''as the case in recognition of
f-tates set up under ter1ns of the Treaty of \Tersailles in
l920. Sin1ilarly recognition of a state by another state
f)u bsequent to recognition of the new political entity by
the parent state, of 'Yhich it had formerly been a part,
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<loes not give rise to serious problems. ~"fhe same 1nay
Le said of recognition of a state formed by union of t\YO
or more states in accord \vith their own action.
Problems of recognition have arisen most frequently
in connection \vith the atten1pts of groups, varying in
nature and objective, seeking to break off fro1n an r,stablished state or to supplant an existing governn1ent. The
policies of recognition in such cases have varied in different states and at different ti.mes in the sa1ne state.
The changes in governments in Central and South
...t\.n1erican states during the nineteenth and early t"~en..:
tieth centuries afford many examples of recognition.
After the vVorld \V ar new problems arose in regard
to recognition. These \Yere numerous in the transition
from the Russian Empire to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the case of the United States of
A1nerica, sixteen years elapsed before recognition on
November 16, 1933; but Russia did not recognize the
United States after the Declaration of Independence
for a period of thirty-three years, till 1809. In each
case there was an apparent .dislike of the system of
government that had been established.
The failure of an established state to recognize by
entering into diplomatic or other relations \Yith a political entity does not necessarily predicate anything as
to its existence.
The United States in the nineteenth century looked
with favor upon the recognition of other American states
setting up governments on a model similar to its o\vn
and favored co1nplete separation from Europe. Recognition on the basis of de facto control of the political
organization was common, particularly when this involved popular control.
Later \Villingness of the ne\v entity to meet its obligations became a factor in granting recognition.
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As relations became n1ore close, the question of the
legitiinate character of a new government, as "~en as
probable stability, were iinportant considerations.
''Then a ne'v state 'vas set up by an international
agreement of a general character, like some of the
treaties of peace, recognition might follow 'vithout any
iinplication as to the policy of the recognizing state.
Recognition of a ne'v state or new government "" hich
by revolution succeeds a prior state may merely be recognition of an accomplished fact.
· The admission that an organized body of armed men
are seeking a politic'al end in an established state n1ay
be essential for the peaceful conduct of relations bet,veen
the insurrectionists and outside states. This does not
i1nply any recognition of a political status of the insurrectionists but merely an accon11nodation to the facts.
Policy of the United States in 1870.-0n November
16, 1870, the Spanish Cortes elected the Duke of Aosta
l(ing of Spain. In reporting this the American Minister stated that "The incidents of the session are not
regarded as promising a tranquil reign nor even a peaceful accession to the throne." Referring to this con1~
1nunication, Secretary Fish said, December 16, 1870:
"It has been the policy of the United States to recognize the
g-o vernments de facto of the countries with which we hold diplomatic relations. Such was our course when the republic was
established in France in 1848, and again in 1870, and in each
case accepted by the French people. Such was our course in
:Mexico when the republic was maintained by the people of that
country in spite of foreign efforts to establish a monarchy hy
military force. We have always accepted the general acquiescence of the people in a political change of government as a
conclusive evidence of the will of the nation. When, however.
there has not been such acquiescence, and armed resistance has
been shown to changes made or attempted to be reade under the
form of law, the United States have applied to other nations the
rule that the organization which has possession of the national
archives and of the traditions of government, and which has
been inducted to power under the forms of law, must be presumed to be the exponent of the desires of the people, until a
rival political organization shall have established the contrary.
Your course in the present case will be governed by this rule.

•
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''Should there be circumstances which lead J·ou to doubt the
propriety of recognizing the Duke of Aosta as King of Spain, it
\Yill be easy to communicate with the Department by telegraph
and ask instructions. Should there be no such circumstances,
the general policy of the United States, as well as their interests in the present relations with Spain, call for an early and
cheerful recognition of the change which the nation has made."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1871, p. 742.)

Late nineteenth century policy .-The attitude of the

United States in the late nineroenth century "\vas shown
in instructions to diplomatic representatives in South
.AJnerica. The Actirig Secretary of State wrote to the
)finister as follo,vs :
"Upon your return to your post, if you then ascertain that the
provisional government of Bolivia being de facto administered
by the junta according to regular methods, affording reasonable
guarantees of stability and international responsibility, and
without organized resistance, you will notify the junta that you
are authorized by the President to enter into relations with
the provisional government, and will notify the Department of
your action in order that the President may make appropriate
reply to the autograph letter addressed to him by the junta
on the 26th of April last." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1899,
p. 107.)

Secretary Hay instructed the Minister to the Dominican Republic, October 19, 1899:
Upon your being satisfied that the new government of Santo
Domingo is in possession of the executive forces of the nation
and administering the public affairs with due regard for the
obligations of international law and treaties, you will enter into
full relations with it." (Ibid, p. 249.)

Pana1na, 1903.-A circular letter from the provisional

government comn1ittee in Panama was received by the
Consul General, November 5, 1903, 12: 50 P. M., saying
that the "Department of Panama "\vithdraws from the
Republic of the United States of Colombia and formed
the Republic of Panama."
Secretary of State Hay sent the following telegram
to the Consul General at 12: 51 P. M., November 6,
1903:
"The people of Panama have, by an apparently unanimous
movement, dissolved their political connection with the Republic
of Colombia and resumed their independence. When you are
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satisfied that a de facto gon~rnment, republican in form, and
without substantial opposition from its own people, has been
established in the State of Panama, you will enter into relations
with it as the responsible goV"ernment of the territory and look
to it for all due action to protect the persons and property of
citizens of the United States and to keep open the isthmian
transit in accordance with the obligations of existing treaties
governing the relation of the United States to that territory.
"Communicate above to l\Iahnros, who will be governed -by
those instructions in entering into relations with the local authorities."' (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1003, p. 233.)

Seizu.re by insurgents.-Among the more firmly established states of the 'vorld there has been a grow·ing
tendency in the twentieth century to take a less liberal
attitude toward insurgents endeavoring to overthrow or
to supplant recognized states. Stability in governments
has been regarded as an attribute to be favored, and
frequent changes to be discouraged.
~Iany treaties have prov-ided that only established
courts shall be competent to pass upon matters of prize.
Seizure and detention by insurgents of vessels of
states not recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents
has been regarded as having no justification in la,v.
rrhe statement of l\fr. 'Vharton, w·hen Solicitor in
1885, 'vas detailed and coYered the proposal of Colo1nbia
that insurgent vessels be treated as pirates:
"DEPART:MEXT OF STATE. LAW BFRF...AU,

1Vashington, D. C., May 18, 1885.
"Sm: In my report of April 21, 1885, I stated as follows:
'· (1) "\Yhen vessels belonging to citizens of the United States
have been seized and are now navigated on the high seas by
persons not representing any Go"Vernment or belligerent power
recognized by the United States, such vessels may be captured
nnd re.cued by their owners, or by United States cruisers acting for such owners; and all force which is necessary for such
purposes may be used to make the capture effectual.
"(2) The Government of the United States of Colombia is
liable not onl~· for any injury done by it or with its permission
to citizens of the United State~ or their property, but for any
such injury which by the exercise of reasonable care it could
have averted; and it is also liable for damage done to such
vessels when by reasonable care it would have averted such
c!amage.
"This report was approYed by the Secretary, and the company
was duly informed thereof :\fay 16, 1883. I ha"Ve now before me,
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tmder date of l\:lay 18, instant, a second application from the
company, stating the· unlawful seizure of two additional vessels
by the insurgents by whom the seizure noticed in the prior report was made. I beg now to report that on this state of facts
these steamers may be retaken by United States men-of-war and
restored to their owners on the same principles as sustained the
conclusion given to this effect in n1y prior report. Under all the
circumstances of the case I now respectfully submit the following directions be given by the Secretary:
''First. That an instruction be sent to the United States minister at Bogata containing this and the prior report above
Inentioned.
"Second. That the papers in this case be immediately forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy, with the request that the
vessels thus unlawfully seized and now possessed by the insurgents be retaken when on the high seas by any force the
United States 1nay be able to use for that purpose.
"In closing this report I beg to call attention to the following paragraph at the end of the recent dispatch frmn this Department as to the status on the high seas of vessels owned by
the insurgents in question:
"'Secondly. The Government of the United States cannot regard as pi;ratical vessels manned by parties in arms against the
Government of the United States of Colombia, when such vessels are passing to and from ports held by such insurgents,
or even when attacking ports in the possession of the National
Government. In the late civil war the United States at an
early period of the struggle surrendered the position that those
n1anning the Confederate cruisers were pirates under inte:cnational law. The United States of Colombia cannot, sooner or
later, do otherwise than accept the sa1ne view. But, however
this may be, no neutral power can acquiesce in the position now
taken by the Colombian Government. 'Vhatever n1ay be the
demerits of the vessels in the power of the insurgents, or whatever may be the status of those 1nanning them under the municipal law of Colombia, if they be brought by the act of the
Xational Government within the operation of that law, there
can be no question that such vessels, when engaged as abo\·e
stated, are not, by the law of nations, pirates; nor can they be
regarded as pirates by the United States.'
"It will be seen, therefore, that the crews n1anning these vessels cannot be regarded by this Government as pirates. But
while this is the case, and while it may be conceded that vessels
seized by them on the high seas are seized under claim of right,
yet, vessels belonging to citizens of the United States so seized
by them Inay be rescued by our cruisers acting for the owners
of such vessels in the same wav that we could reclahn vessels
derelict on the high seas.
"
"Respectfully submitted.
FRAXCis ".,.HARTox, Solicitor."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1885, p. 212.)
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Portugal, 1911.-In a telegratn frotn the Secretary of
State to the Charge d'Affaires in Lisbon, J nne 6, 1911,
it 'Yas stated:
''So soon as the Constituent .Assembly, which n1eets on the
19th instant, shall ha\e expressed the voice of the people and
settled upon the fonn of government to be adopted by Portugal,
you are instructed to inform the minister for foreign affairs
of its official recognition by the Government of the United States
of America. You will be prepared to do this if possible the same
day that the Constituent Assembly takes definite and final
action." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1911, p. 690.)

illexico, 1911.-In discussion of troubles in ~1exico in
the early second decade of the twentieth century, questions arose in regard to the nature of certain actions of
anned bodies of n1en. Of these acts Secretary 1\::nox, on
J nne 17, 1911, said:
"Without desiring to enter into any discus::;ion or controversy
with your excellency regarding the status of persons who take
up arms and make war under the circumstances recited in your
note now under acknowledgment, I beg to suggest for your excellency's consideration that the movement in Lower California
appears to be the result of the activities of a :Mexican political
party; that it is reported that the a 'Vowed object of this ~Iexican
party is the throwing off of Mexican authority and the establishment of a socialistic republic in Lower California; and
finally that the subversion of one fonn of government and the
establishment of another has, upon this he1nisphere, been uniformly regarded as a political 1novement entirely irrespecth·e of
the propriety or justice of the cause espoused." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1911, p. 500.)

AIer:cico, 1913, 1915.-0n February 28, 1913, explanations of the attitude of the United States to''""ard recognition in ~fexico 'Yere con1municated to the Atnerican
~.\.tnbassador:

"The Government of the United States is in de facto relations
for the purpose of transacting all business with those in de facto
control, who are the only effective authority in evidence.
Whether the recent resignations under duress and the subsequent
proceedings of the ::\Iexican Congress suffice under the :\Iexican
law to clothe the present regime with such de jure status as
attached to the interim government of De la Barra is a question
into which the Government of the United States is not now
obliged to enter.
''A distinction may be drawn between de facto relations with
a de facto government and formal recognition of such gov-
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ernreent, just as the same distinction may be drawn between
de facto relations with and formal recognition of a normal and
permanent Government. Formal recognition would in either
case require some formal act of recognition, as, for example, the
formal reply to a note announcing the new government or the
receiving or accrediting of an ambassador. Any such formal act
of recognition is to be avoided just at the present. In the meantime this Government is considering the question in the light of
the usual tests applied to such cases, important among which are
the question of the degree to which the population of Mexico
acquiesce in and assent to the new regime and the question of
disposition and ability to protect foreigners and their interests
and to respond to all international obligations." (Foreign Relations, Ibid., U. S., 1913, p. 748.)

The Secretary of State made it generally known on
October 19, 1915, that General Carranza had been recognized as the Chief Executive of the de facto Government
of Mexico, as follows:
"The Ambassadors of Brazil, Chile and Argentina, and the
1\Iinisters of Bolivia, Uruguay and Guatemala, who have been in
conference with me in regard to the recognition of a government
in Mexico, will, under instructions from their several Governments, recognize today the de facto Government of 1\:Iexico of
which General Venustiano Carranza is the Chief Executive."
(Ibid., 1915, p. 771.)

The Secretary of State on the same day made kno\vn
that the United States would accredit a diplomatic representative to the de £acto government.
Peru, 191,4.-A revolution in Peru, February 4, 1914,
removed the President from office and placed executive
e:"uthority in the hands of a Provisional Junta. A telegram from the Secretary of State to the American Minister on February 12, 1914, was as follows :
"The Junta created by the Congress being in uncontested exercise of executive power and such exercise being freely acquiesced
in by the people, you are instructed to recognize the Junta as a
Provisional Government pending the establishment of a permanent
executive."
(Ibid., 1914, p. 1063.)

"BRYAN."

Protectorate o·ver Egypt, 1919.-In reply to a letter o£
Senator Q,ven, the Secretary of State said on December
16, 1919:
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''SIR : I baYe the honor to ackno,vledge the receipt of your
letter of ?\'ovcmher 29th last, in which ~your inquire as to the
effect of this GoYernment's recognition of the so-called protectorate proclaimed by Great Britain oYer Egypt on December 18.
1914.
"In reply I beg to state that the Department does not nuderstand that Egypt was, prior to the British proclamation of December 18, 191,1, in possession of full independent ~overeign rights.
"The effect of this GoYernment's qualified recognition of April,
1919, was to acknowledge with the reserYation set forth at that
time only such control of Egyptian affairs as had been set forth
in the notice of the British Governn1ent transn1i tted to the Department on December 18, 1914, a copy of which is enclosed.
''It is assumed that it is the purpose of Great Britain to carry
t. m t the as~urances given by King George the Fifth of England to
the late Sultan of E~Tpt as published in the London Times of
December 21, 1D14.
"I have etc.
ROEERT LAXSIXG.''

(Ibid., 1919, vol. II, p. 209.)

Recognition of lVorld lr ar states.-The recognition
of states set up as a result of the 'Vorld YV.ar is upon a
basis w·holly unlike that in\olved in rec:Jgnition of a
;>olitieal unity based upon insurrection or belligerency.
The ne"T states set up by the Treaty of "'\T ersailles "Tere
given place in the fan1ily of nations "·hen the provisions
of the treaty came into effect and the responsibilities of
state existence 'Yere en1bodied in a responsible governlnent.
The creation of some of these states \Yas due to action
external to the area upon 'vhich the physical conditions
of state existence rested and the political organization
\Yas externally detern1ined for the area. A11 insurrection.
ho,YeYer, has its origin within an exis6ng state and in
opposition to its control. The parent state 1nay be reluctant to admit the existence of a ne'v 5tate in either
case.
Sympathetic interest.-Just ho'v far a favorable attitude of one state toward a party opposed to another
established state may be made kno,,n is a matter of difference of opinion and may depend upon the strength and
influence of the respectiv-e parties.
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For so1netin1e previous to January 1913, there had been
disturbed conditions in the Dominican Republic. On
January 15, 1913, the American Minister reported to the
Secretary of State:
"President Nouel advised me this 1norning of a plot to gain
possession of the fort here by prominent Horacista generals.
Horacio Vasquez himself denounced the plot and offered to place
himself and some of his followers in the fort to maintain order.
"The Archbishop [President Nouel] bas for some time been
urged arbitrarily to abolish the present Congress and make hiln~elf dictator.
He has absolutely refused and is thinking of conYoking Congress in extraordinary session to consider constitutional
reforms and other matters.
"He expresses himself as despondent over the probabilities of
~uccess in his efforts for good governn1ent unless the Government of the United States takes an active part in contro1ling elections and the establishment of a government expressing the will
of the people. He therefore requests me to obtain from you if
r•ossible a statement that can be made public as to the necessity
of such a step on our part if the disorders of the vast should tend
to recur.
RUSSELL."

(Foreign Relations, U. S. 1913, p. 418.)

The Secretary of State replied:
"DEPARTME...~T OF STATE,

"lVashington, January 22, 1913.
"The following statement may be given to President Nouel as a
message from me, to be made public if he sees fit:
'' 'The most sympathetic interest is felt by the President and
Government of the United States in your unselfish and patriotic
efforts to maintain lawful and orderly government and to introduce needful reforms, thus assuring to the Dominican nation the
blessings of prosperity and peace. The President and Governn1ent
of the United States sincerely wish that your patient endeaYors
may so succeed as to exclude the possibility of a recurrence of
such disorders as have afflicted the Dominican people. Those disorders would by their recurrence make more onerous the duty of
the United States under its conventional and moral obligations
never to be indifferent to the peace and order of the Dominican
Republic.'
"You will do everything in your power to hold up the hands of
the President, Archbishop Nouel, and to impress him with the
necessity of patiently continuing in office. It would be well to
advert in your conversations to the fact that under the present
electoral law it is apparently almost impossible to accomplish
much in the direction of free elections, however willing the GoYernment of the United States might be to lend its aid; and that as
a prerequisite to free elections it would seem indispensable to provide some form of previous registration and some form of voting
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that would prevent fraud. You might also suggest in infonnal
conversation that besides the electoral law other reforms seem to
the Department to be urgently needed, and that these might possibly be accomplished without reform of the Constitution. For
instance, reform of the laws relating to provincial and communal
goYernments, the law of conscription (so as to provide for an
annual enlistment by lot instead of at the will of local milibtry
chiefs), and the creation of a right to question arrest by means of
habeas corpus or other such proceedings.
"You might also point out to the President how much easier it
would be for the United States to lend its aid if necessary to
assist in the conduct of free and orderly elections if such reforn1s
were realized.
KNox.''
(Ibid, p. 419.)

Under date of September 12, 1913, Secretary Bryan set
forth his policy under the Convention of 1907:
"Firm in its intention to cooperate with the legally constituted
Government in order that revolutionary actiYity may cease, the
Department of State makes known to the revolutionists and those
who foment revolutions the following:
"Under the Convention of 1907, the Dominican Republic cannot
increase its debt without the consent of the United States of
America, and this Government will not consent that the Dominican Government increase its debts for the purpose of paying revolutionary expenses and claims. l\loreover, this administration
would look with disfavor on any administrative act that would
have for its object increase of the taxes, thereby imposing a burden upon the people, for the purpose of satisfying revolutionists.
And should the revolution succeed, this Government, in view of
the President's declaration of policy, would withhold recognition
of the de facto government, and consequently withhold the portion of the customs collections belonging to Santo Domingo as long
as an unrecognized de facto government should exist.'' (Ibid,
p. 427.)

Civil strife and belligerent cruiser.-In 1915 while
Liberia was neutral, a British cruiser, the Highflyer,
reported to the President of Liberia that it had come to
nfonrovia to offer assistance in civil disturbances then
preYailing. An American Yessel of war had been requested by Liberia and the vessel had been sent.
On October 19, 1915, the Alnerican Charge at l\fonroYia
reported:
"The British Highflyer arrived :Monrovia yesterday. Informed

~hat Commander states to President be was ordered here by Brit-

Ish Government to offer Liberian Government assistance in Kru
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disturbances until arrival Chester. Liberian Government, having
appealed to the Government of the United States for aid, prefers
not to avail itself of British assistance except so advised by the
Government of the United States. Disturbances unabated but
measures already taken deemed sufficient to hold situation until
Chester arrives November 1. Liberian Government awaits Department's advice before answering Commander."
(Foreign
Relations, U. S., 1915, p. 629.)

The Secretary of Stat: then communicated with the
American Ambassador at London, who immediately
replied:
"DEJPART:MENT OF STATE,

Washington, October 20, 1915.
"2312. Legation, l\1onrovia, advises that British cruiser Highflyer arrived Monrovia October 18. Commander informs President

of Liberia that he was ordered there to offer assistance in quelling
uprising of native Krus until arrival of American naval steamship
Chester due about November 1. Department informed measures
already adopted deemed sufficient to hold disturbances in check
until arrival Chester and Liberian Government, while deeply
appreciative courteous offer, feels that its position of neutrality
would be violated by Highftyer remaining in Liberian water more
than twenty-four hours. Take case up immediately with British
Government. Cable reply. Department has communicated orally
with British Embassy here.
LANSING."
"AMERIOAN EMBASSY,

London, October 21, 1915.

"3070. Your 2312, October 20. The British Government has telegraphed its Consul General at Monrovia to instruct the commander of the Highftyer to depart immediately unless disorder
demands its presence.
(Ibid., p. 630.)

AMEJRICAN AMBASS,ADOB.• ,

Poland, 1.919.-0n January 22, 1919, the American
Commission to Negotiate Peace sent to the Acting Secretary of State the following in regard to the Provisional
Polish Government:
"Acting under direction from the President, I have sent the
following telegram to Mr. Paderewski which gives full recomition
to ~he Pr?vision~l Poli~h Government. In view of the ne~essity
of Immediate action I did not send the communication through the
Department as I would normally do.
"Following is the message :
" 'The President of the United States directs me to extend to
you as Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the
1820-37--3
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Provisional Polish Government his sincere wishes for your success
in the high oflice which you have assumed and his earnest hope
that the Government of which you are a part will bring prosperit;y
to the Republic of Poland.
" 'It is my privilege to extend to you at this time 1ny personal
greetings and officially to assure you that it will be a source of
gratification to enter into official relations with you at the earliest
opportunity. To render to your country such aid as is possible
at this tilne as it enters upon a ne~cycle of independent life, will
be in full accord with that spirit of friendliness which has in the
pnst animated the American people in their relations with your
countrymen.'" (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1D1D, \Ol. II, p. 741.)
Y1~;goslavia,

1919.-rrhe American Comn1ission to Negotiate Peace connnunicated the follo\ving to the Acting
Secretary of State on February 6, 1919 :
"The Secretary of State will give out on l 1,ebruary 7th the
following statement in regard to the union of the Jugo Slav
peoples, which you may give out to the press immediately:
" 'On )lay 29, 1918, the Government of the United States expressed its sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo
SlaY race and on June 28 declared that all branches of the Slavish
race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule.
After having achieved their freedom from foreign oppression the
Jugo Slav [s] formerly under Austro-Hungarian rule on various
occasions expressed the desire to unite with the Kingdom of
Sen·in. The Servian Govern1nent on its part has publicly and
officially accepted the Union of the Serb, Croat and SloYene
peoples. The Government of the United States, therefore, welcomes the nnion while recognizing that the final settle1nent of
territorial frontiers must be left to the Peace Conference for
determination according to desires of the peoples concerned.' "
(Ibid., p. 899.)

The designation "Yugoslavia" becan1e official in preference to "l(ingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" by
decree of October 3, 1929.
Aid to established state.-Aid may be of various descriptions and for differing reasons. States already
established usually wish to maintain the status quo.
Sometimes there 1nay be economic or other reasons for
such a "·ish. Of course, if one state is in debt to the
nationals of another state, the second state \vill be interested in the maintenance of the economic stability of the
debtor state.
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So1neti1nes a friendly attitude 1nay be interpreted to
i1nply 1nore than had been originally intended.
In a so1newhat involved state1nent of the Nicaraguan
Minister to the Secretary of State of the United States,
. A. ugust 24, 1921, it \vas said:
"The Govern1nent of Nicaragua placing confidence in the loan
contracts made sometime ago with the banking concerns of Brown
Brothers and Company and J. & W. Seligman and Company of
New York, with the friendly assistance of the Government of the
United States, under which contracts the collection of the customs
duties of the Republic was turned oyer to a Receiver General
appointed by the GoYernment of Nicaragua and nominated by
the Govern1nent of the United States through which contracts
and through the financial plan which was set up in Nicaragua in
accord with the Government of the United States, for the purpose
of placing its public finances upon a substantial basis and thus
promoting its progress and prosperity, for which purpose its
general estimates were also kept within the amounts that were
indispensable for the conduct of the Governn1ent, ailning to carry
out the objects that have been aimed at and relying at the same
time on the declarations of the Department of State that it would
not brook any armed intervention against the Government of
Nicaragua that would unavoidably be attended with the consequence of throwing its budget out of balance and making it
impossible to meet its obligations, for which Your Excellency's
Government stands as the friendly mediator, the Government of
)Jicarngua has omitted for eight years to keep its war stores on
the proper footing and being at this juncture without available
funds that \Vould provide these without a very serious upset in
the discharge of its obligations, n1y Government wishes to be
supplied by Your Excellency's Government from the stores left
over fro1n the world war and to be paid for according to such
arrange1nents as may be agreed to, the implements that may not
be in nse and hereinbelow described:
Five thousand rifles.
Three 1nillion cartriclges for rifles.
25 machine guns.
250 thousand rounds for machine guns.
2 military aeroplanes, with their regulation supply of ammunition and indispensable spare parts." (Foreign Relations, 1921,
vol. II, p. 565.)

When the Secretary of War raised \Yith the Secretary
of State the question of general policy of the sale of arms,
the Secretary of State replied that each request for the
purchase of arn1s should be considered separately and
according to its particular merits:
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"'Vith regard to the particular case under discussion, I am
inclined to think that the sale of the arms requested by Nicaragua
would be desirable from the point of T'iew of this Deparhnent, in
T'iew of our special interest in the maintenance of stable government in that country, and in view of our participation in the
supervision of the financial affairs of the Republic. I am informed
that Nicaragua bas not at the present time sufficient war material
to deal effectively with revolutionary bands which have been operating in the northern part of the Republic, and I consider it T'ery
desirable that the Government should be placed in a position
where it will be able to maintain order." (Ibid., p. 569.)

Closure of ports.-An established state may close its
ports in time of war to vessels of war of the belligerents
or it n1ay prescribe the conditions of entrance and sojourn. In absence of proclamation the 24-hour rule of
sojourn generally prevails.
The Institute of International Law in the session of
1910 stated that a neutral state is free to close or to open
its ports to vessels of 'var of the belligerents engaged in
the contest.
During the 'Vorld "\Var neutral states closed their ports
within a given area to all vessels of war, closed son1e.
ports as war ports or naval areas, closed many ports except during specified hours, regulated or forbade the
entrance of certain classes of vessels, and made other
regulations.
The principle that a neutral state may regulate or
prohibit the use of its ports by vessels of 'var seems to be
generally accepted.
Soviet governrnents and r-ecognition.-After the abdication of Czar Nicholas II, March 15, 1917, a provisional
government was established with a provisional ministry
headed by I\:erensky. The United States through its
ambassador formally recognized this ne\v government on
)farch 22, 1917.
The Bolsheviki overthre'v this new government in
Xovmnber. The aim of the Bolsheviki was to set up a
dictatorship of the proletariat involving a complete social and economic revolution 'vith the abolition of private
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property and repudiation of prior international obligations.
Partly from domestic party political pressure, Great
Britain (February 1), Italy (February 7), and France
(October 28) recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in 1924. Some neighboring states had previously recognized the U. S. S. R. The An1bassador of
the Provisional Government of Russia remained in
'Vashington in that capacity till the middle of 1922.
The method of recognition of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics varied. Great Britain, France, Nor'vay, S'veden, and Denmark recognized by formal notes.
Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and other states made
treaties or ~stablished diplomatic relations.
Oa8e of O'etjen v. Oentral Leather Oo., 1918.-The
Supreme Court of the United States on March 11, 1918,
said, 'vhen the question of the status of a revolutionary
government 'vas· involved:
"It is also the result of the interpretation by this court of the
principles of international law that when a government which
originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political
department of our government as the de jure government of the
country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive
in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.
lVillia.ms v. Bruf{y, 96 U. S. 176, 186; Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 253. Sees. c. 65 Fed. Rep. 577.
"To these principles we must add that: 'Every sovereign State
is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as behveen themselves.' Underhill v. Hernande.~, 168
U. S. 250, 253; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213

u.s. 347.

"Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, we have a
duly commissioned military commander of what must be accepted
as the legitimate government of 1\Iexico, in the progress of a
revolution, and when conducting active independent operations,
seizing and selling in l\1exico, as a military contribution, the
property in controversy, at the time owned and in the possession
of a citizen of l\1exico, the assignor of the plaintiff in error.
Plainly this was the action, in 1\Iexico, of the legitimate 1\:Iexican
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goYerntnent when dealing with a l\Iexican citizen, and, as we have
seen, for the soundest reasons, and upon repeated decision of
this court such action is not subject to reexamination and modiftcation b:v the courts of this country.
''The p~inciple that the conduct of one independent goYernment
cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as
applicable to a case inYolYing the title to property brought within
the custody of a court, such as we have here, as it was held to be
to the cases cited, in which claims for damages were based upon
nets done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest
considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit
the Yalidity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined
and perhaps condemned by the courts of another wouid Yery certainly 'imperil' the atnicable relations between governments and
Yex the peace of nations.'" ·( Oetjen v. Oentral Leather Oo., 246
u.s. 297.)

This pri nci p]e has been reaffirmecl. in other A1nerican
cases and also in cases before the English Courts.
In the case of Princess Paley Olga Y. lreis.z in 1929,
Scrutton, L. J., saicl:
"The United States, situate in the neighbourhood of South and
Central A1nerican Republics, where the life of any Governtnent is
precarious and its death rarely by natural" causes, frequently
found in its territory property seized by a reYolutionary force
which ultimately succeeded in establishing itself in power and
there sold the goods it had seized to persons who exported then1
to the United States, where they were claimed by their original
owners. In Oetjen Y. Central LPta.ther Oo. (2) these facts occurred
with reference to a seizure in 1\Iexico of property of a :\Iexican
citizen which when sold came into the United States, and in
Ricaud v. American :Metal Co. (3) they occurred again with respect to the property of a citizen of the United States." ( [1929]
1 K. B., 718.)

Revolution in /)pain. 19SC.-During the period of civil
strife in Spain 1nany problems arose in regard to the
treatn1ent of foreign property. In an instruction of the
Department of State of the United States delivered to
the Spanish Govern1nent on August 5, 1936~ it 'vas stated
in beha]f of the United States that:
''This Government cannot admit that private property, whether
in the hands of American nationals or abandoned bv them temporarily because of conditions over which they haYc no control,
tnay be interfered with with impunity or denied the protection to
which it is entitl~d under international law. This Government
must, of course, look to the Government of Spain for the protec-
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tion of such property and for indemnification for any delinquency
in this respect.
''In the event of requisition for the necessities of war or otherwise of American property this Government must insist that
provision be made for prompt and full compensation to the
owners." (Department of State. Press Release. Vol. XV, p.
131.)

\Vhen it was reported on August 30 that an aircraft
had dropped bombs near the United States destroyer
[{ ane, the Secretary of State on the same day in a stateInent said:
"Since both the Government forces and the opposing forces in
Spain, in the friendliest spirit, have made every possible effort
to avoid injury to American nationals and American property,
it can only be assumed that the attack on the United States
destroyer Kane was due to its identity having been mistaken by
a plane of one faction for a vessel of the other.
''Because of this friendly attitude and the absence of any .
motive whatsoever to attack an American vessel, it is not conceivable that either a Spanish Government plane or an insurgent
plane would knowingly make attack upon an American naval
vessel. Tbe Secretary of State, at the direction of the President,
immediately brought this incident to the attention of the Spanish
Government, through the American Embassy at :\Iadrid, and to
General Francisco Franco, informally through the American consul at Seville, with the request that both sides issue instructions
in the strongest terms, as the American Government feels confident they will desire to do, to pr:e,ent another incident of this
character, it being well known in every quarter that the sole
purpose of the presence of American na\al vessels about the
Spanish coast is to afford facilities for the ren1oval of American
nationals from Spain." (Ibid., p. 103.)

The Secretary of State also instructed the . A.merican
E1nbassy that:
"Since the plane making the attack was unidentified the President has directed that this incident be brought to the attention
of the Spanish Go\ernment, through you and informally, with no
intention as to recognition, to the attention of General Franco
through the American Consul at Seville, with the request that
both sides issue instructions in the strongest terms, as the American Government feels confident they will desire to do, to prevent
another incident of this character.
"Take up this matter immediately with the Spanish Government in the sense of the foregoing, and endeavor to obtain a
categorical statement as to whether the plane n1aking this attack
was a Government plane, and urge and insist upon definite assurance that appropriate instructions will immediately be issued to
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the GoYernment a r n1ed f orces. Telegraph ilnmediately and fully
results of your r epresentations." (Ibid. , p. 202.)

R esu/Jne.-In the statement of Situation I states X,
...~ and B haYe recognized the insurrectionists against
state Y, the Yotists, as state Yota. State X had preYiously given unofficial aid and show·n sympathy for the
Yotists. Other states than X, A and B, have not recognized the Y otists as a state, though the insurgency of
the Y otists is admitted.
The exact time at which a body of insurgents beco1nes
a state before the parent state has recognized the1n as
such is not settled. If the parent state grants recognition, the soYereignty of the parent state terminates at
the ti1ne of the grant and the insurrectionists, so fa _~ as
·the parent state is concerned, become independent. The
responsibility of the parent state for the acts of the
insurrectionists terminates with this recognition. For
foreign states granting the insurrectionists recognition
as a state, the date 'vould be deter1nined by that of
recognition.
States A, B, and X, therefore, cannot hold state Y
responsible for any acts of the recognized state Y ota,
and Y ota 1nay carry on 'var under the accepted rules so
far as states A, B, and X are concerned and the aircraft
of Y ota " ·ould after declaration of "·ar be treated
according to the rules of "·ar and neutrality.
It is generally accepted that a declaration of war by
a state creates a state of 'var as bet,veen it and the party
against which the war has been declared. The parent
state in time of insurrection is also under obligation to
respect the la"·s of 'var. Prior to the recognition of the
belligerency or statehood of insurgents by the parent
state, non-recognizing states though admitting the fact
of insurrection and accommodating themselves thereto
migh~ be regarded as assuming an unfriendly attitude
to"·ard the p arent state if they accorded to the insur-
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gents the full rights of belligerents. It ·would, therefore, become a question of policy as to what attitude a
state might take toward an insurgent party not recognized by it or the parent state as a belligerent or as a
state. The fact that three states have recognjzed insurgents as a state prior to recognition by the parent
state puts other states under no obligation to treat the
insurgents as belligerents or as a state. The fact, that
the party admitted by all states other than three to be
insurgents issues a declaration of war against a nonrecognizing state, does not change the legal relationships of other non-recognizing states. To grant any
o•er conclusion would be to encourage insurrections
and declarations of ·war by parties not considered as
having attained responsible political status. There
would be no obligation upon non-recognizing states to
submit to seizure of its merchant vessels by unrecognized belligerents, nor would the non-recognizing states,
eYen jf themselves at "\Yar, be under obligations to submit to restrictions in the use of ports not i1nposed by
established states, though there might be risk when insurgents declare "\Var and are able by force to maintain
the declaration "\vhich has been published. If the ports
are those of a recognized state, the regulations of that
state prevail.
SOLUTION

(a) 1. The naval and aircraft of Y ota and of

0 are

to be treated by states B and D as naval and aircraft
of belligerents, though Y ota would not be regarded as
a state by state D.
2. The recognition of Y ota as a state by Y entitles the
naval and air craft of Yota to the sa1ne treatment as
the naval and aircraft of state C in all neutral ports.
(b) The cruiser of state D may, outside the jurisdic-
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tion of a foreign state, demand and use necessary force
to rescue the n1erchant vessel of D.
(c) State E, not having recognized the Yotists as a
state, are not bound to respect the declaration of closure,
though state E must take into consideration the risk
jnyo]Yed in disregarding the declaration.

